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Corporate Governance Practices to Restore 
Trust, Focus on Long-Term Performance, and 
Rebuild Leadership*
Committee for Economic Development (CED) policy statements on 
corporate governance issues since 2006 have analyzed: 
•	 How	corporations	could	reform	governance	practices	to	regain	the	
public’s	trust	in	the	wake	of	corporate	scandals;	
•	 How	corporate	directors	could	promote	the	long-term	enduring	
qualities	of	their	enterprises	rather	than	give	in	to	financial	market	
“short-termism;”	and
•	 How	directors	could	link	long-term	performance	and	public	goals	to	
improve corporate performance and rebuild their leadership position 
within	society.
This	purpose	of	this	review	is	to	promote	discussion	and	debate	on	these	
critical	issues.			We	encourage	corporate	leaders,	government	policy	
makers,	and	the	interested	public	to	join	us	in	that	discussion	and	volun-
teer	their	views.
Analysis
As CED began to consider corporate governance issues in 2002, the 
highly visible accounting scandals that surrounded the collapse of Enron, 
WorldCom	and	several	other	major	companies—together	with	the	
revelation of fraud and other acts of malfeasance by corporate execu-
tives—aroused	public	outrage,	called	into	question	the	values	and	ethics	
of business leaders, and undermined the public’s confidence in public 
companies.		Unfortunately,	as	we	concluded	deliberations	in	2009,	public	
outrage is again being fueled by reports of greed, conflicts of interest, and 
other	misdeeds,	and	by	the	growing	expenditure	of	public	money	to	
support private businesses as the government attempts to fend off a 
deepening	recession.
The	business	and	academic	leaders	who	comprise	CED	are	unwavering	
advocates	for	the	free	market	system,	and	just	as	firm	in	the	belief	that	
* Private Enterprise, Public Trust: The State of Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley(2006); Built to 
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businesses	and	their	leaders	must	earn	the	public’s	trust.		Perceptions	that	
firms flout rules, behave unethically, and use deceptive business processes 
weaken	confidence	in,	and	support	for,	the	free	enterprise	system.		Execu-
tive compensation untethered to economic value violates perceptions of 
fairness,	leads	to	mistrust,	and	courts	a	stifling	regulatory	backlash.	
Numerous	small	and	large	corporate	policies,	processes,	and	structures—
from	nuts-and-bolts	decision-making	by	line	managers	to	higher-level	
strategic	thinking	by	directors	and	CEOs—have	resulted	in	the	negative	
results	we	have	witnessed	over	the	last	decade.		CED’s	corporate	gover-
nance reports have examined a broad range of reforms in accounting, 
internal controls, executive compensation, succession planning, and other 
board	and	management	practices	that	would	restore	confidence	and	trust	
in	American	corporations	and	their	leaders—a	task	made	more	urgent	by	
our	current	economic	crisis.		
CED’s first corporate governance report, Private Enterprise, Public Trust: 
The State of Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley (2006), addressed 
governmental and corporate policies that affect the behavior of publicly 
traded	companies,	as	well	as	the	confidence	of	investors	in	them.	The	
report	acknowledged	at	the	outset	that	no	laws	or	policies	will	ever	be	
sufficient to end all corporate misbehavior (or, for that matter, misbehav-
ior	in	any	segment	of	public	life).	It	concluded,	however,	that	truly	
independent and inquisitive boards of directors provide the best safe-
guard	against	corporate	wrongdoing,	and	it	recommended	several	ways	by	
which	corporate	governance	practices	could	be	improved.		It	called	for	a	
new	system	of	financial	reporting	that	recognizes	“the	brittle	illusion	of	
accounting	exactitude”—the	misapprehension	that	business	accounts	can	
be	measured	precisely—and	proposed	a	substantially	different	type	of	
financial	statement	to	make	clear	the	necessary	judgments	behind	the	
numbers.	
A	key	theme	embedded	in	these	reports	is	that	decision-making	based	
primarily on short-term financial indicators can damage the ability of 
public	companies—and,	therefore,	of	the	U.S.	economy—to	sustain	
superior	long-term	performance.	Emphasis	on	reported	quarterly	earn-
ings,	compensation	tied	to	earnings	per	share,	shortened	CEO	tenures,	
and financial reports that fail adequately to inform about company 
performance	impede	the	task	of	building	long-term	value.	These	phe-
nomena	are	commonly	known	as	“short-termism,”	and	CED’s	recom-
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mendations	call	on	corporate	boards	to	use	their	power	either	to	
eliminate	these	practices	or	to	counteract	their	effect.		In	our	second	
report, Built to Last: Focusing Corporations on Long-Term Performance 
(2007),	we	call	on	boards	of	directors	to	address	these	problems	by	
putting the long-term interests of the corporate entity at the forefront of 
their concerns and demonstrating through their actions that those 
concerns	trump	interest	in	short-term	price	movements.		
The focus of our third report, Rebuilding Corporate Leadership: How 
Directors Can Link Long-Term Performance with Public Goals (2009), is on 
the	potential	contributions	boards	of	directors	can	make	to	improve	
corporate strategy and long-term performance by engaging responsibly 
with	the	society	around	them.	The	central	conclusion	of	this	report	is	that	
corporate boards and the leaders they select must integrate relevant 
societal concerns, such as environmental and human rights consider-
ations, into corporate strategy to strengthen long-term competitiveness 
and	the	sustainability	of	both	the	corporation	and	the	society	in	which	it	
exists.		A	successful	framework	requires	that	societal	and	business	leaders	
view	and	treat	each	others	as	partners,	not	adversaries.		Their	actions	and	
public communications should recognize their interdependence and 
shared	goals.
Many	corporate	leaders—directors	and	CEOs—have	found	that	a	
principled,	long-term	view	fosters	greater	appreciation	of	the	interdepen-
dence	between	the	corporation	and	the	society	in	which	it	operates.		
These individuals are leading the development of business strategies that 
take	account	of	societal	challenges	as	a	means	to	ensure	their	corpora-
tions’	and	society’s	long-term	prosperity.		As	important,	some	are	speak-
ing	out	to	urge	U.S.	political	leaders	to	repair	their	broken	systems	so	they	
can begin to solve long-term societal problems that hamper business as 
well	as	society’s	other	constituents.		But	too	few	business	or	political	
leaders	are	following	these	paths.		
Together,	these	three	reports	seek	to	restore	confidence	and	trust	in	
American	corporations	and	their	leaders.	Public	corporations	are	the	
driving	force	of	the	U.S.	economy.		They	are	the	core	of	a	system	unsur-
passed	in	creating	jobs,	income,	and	wealth,	and	in	delivering	a	wide	
choice	of	goods	and	services.		Corporate	leaders	should	understand	it	is	
in their self interest to repair their corporate practices and to engage 
responsibly	with	the	society	around	them.		
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Summary of Key Recommendations
The recommendations of CED’s three corporate governance reports can 
be	grouped	as	follows:
•	 Accountable,	forward-thinking	leadership
•	 Transparent,	honest,	and	meaningful	communications
•	 Long-term,	sustainable	performance
Accountable, forward-thinking leadership:
•	 The	best	approach	to	building	a	high-quality	board	is	to	assign	to	a	
truly independent nominating committee the responsibility for 
recommending	new	board	candidates	and	for	evaluating	the	perfor-
mance	of	existing	board	members.		The	nominating	committee	
should also have the responsibility of recommending committee 
assignments.
•	 The	CEO	is	mainly	responsible	for	carrying	out	the	board’s	direc-
tions.		When	choosing	a	CEO,	the	board’s	selection	committee	
should	be	mindful	of	the	role	that	person	will	play	in	setting	the	tone	
and	direction	of	the	company	with	regard	to	ethics,	integrity,	and	
engagement	with	shareholders	and	other	interested	parties.		The	
board	should	tie	a	portion	of	the	CEO’s	and	senior	management’s	
performance compensation to metrics based on the corporation’s 
performance	on	such	concerns.		
•	 Ensure	that	the	company	has	a	strong	succession	plan	and	grows	
managerial	talent	internally.		In	the	past	20	to	30	years,	we	have	seen	
an	evolution	from	CEOs	who	were	nurtured	and	developed	within	a	
company,	and	who	usually	served	at	the	will	of	the	board	without	a	
contract,	to	a	greater	number	of	CEOs	who	are	hired	from	outside	
and,	for	legitimate	reasons,	are	employed	by	contract.		Developing	
internal talent, in addition to providing direct benefits to the com-
pany, reduces pressure on compensation committees to offer incom-
ing	CEOs	exorbitant	contracts,	complete	with	up-front	signing	
bonuses	and	severance	guarantees.
•	 The	Compensation	committee	should	adopt	measurable,	specific,	and	
genuinely challenging goals (financial, strategic, operational, and 
social)	for	the	performance	of	their	business,	and	judge	management	
by	them.		
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•	 The	compensation	process	must	be	run	by	a	compensation	committee	
composed	of	independent	directors.		And	compensation	consultants,	
when	used,	must	be	entirely	independent	of	management.		In	select-
ing	consultants,	the	committee	must	comprehend	how	the	process	of	
fixing	top	management	compensation	has	broken	down.		Whether	or	
not consultants are used, the compensation committee should have 
direct authority over all terms of any management contract, including 
all	forms	of	compensation.		
•	 Compensation	committees	should	take	care	to	determine	whether	a	
contract	for	a	CEO	is	truly	necessary.		If	the	committee	decides	to	
use a contract, it should understand the potential consequences of all 
contract	provisions.		All	contracts	should	have	reasonable	“sunset”	
provisions.		Neither	a	resignation	nor	a	notice	of	non-renewal	for	an	
employment	agreement	should	automatically	give	rise	to	severance.	
•	 Align	company	executives’	financial	interests	and	incentives	with	the	
long-term	health	of	the	company	and	its	stock	price.		Although	
specific conditions should dictate a company’s policies, in general top 
executives should be expected to purchase over time a substantial 
number	of	shares	with	their	own	money	(not	just	from	compensation	
awards)	and	to	hold	shares	equal	to	an	appropriate	multiple	of	base	
salary.		That	is,	executives	should	have	a	substantial	equity	interest	in	
their company and should be required to act as ‘buy-and-hold’ 
investors.	Vesting	and	exercise	periods	for	equity	grants—options	or	
shares—should	be	increased	beyond	existing	practice	and	tied	to	
multi-year	performance.		For	similar	reasons,	directors	also	should	be	
required	to	buy	and	hold	the	company’s	shares.		
•	 Severance	compensation,	like	all	other	forms	of	executive	compensa-
tion,	should	be	reviewed	carefully	against	criteria	set	by	the	compen-
sation committee of the board, and the board should publicly provide 
full	details	of	awards	and	explain	publicly	to	shareholders	the	reason-
ing	behind	such	awards.	
	•	 The	company	should	have	the	right	to	recapture	top	executive	
bonuses	if	financial	results	by	which	they	were	justified	turn	out	not	
to	have	been	achieved	when	accounts	are	restated.				
•	 The	compensation	committee	should	be	vigilant	to	construct	pay	
packages	that	motivate	executives	to	maximize	the	company’s	long-
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term	economic	value.		For	example,	the	compensation	committee	
may	want	to	spell	out	the	long-term	concerns	they	expect	their	CEO	
and other executives to address, such as employee retention, customer 
satisfaction,	environmental	sustainability,	development	of	new	
products	or	markets,	adaptability	to	changes	in	public	policies,	or	
other	indicators	of	the	company’s	long-term	health.
•	 Engage	major	shareholders	in	a	dialogue	about	executive	compensa-
tion	programs.		Investor	groups	recently	have	begun	to	seek	advisory	
votes	on	executive	compensation,	to	allow	shareholders	to	express	
general approval or disapproval of the company’s executive compen-
sation	plan.		However,	an	advisory	vote	seems	a	crude	and	unneces-
sary	instrument	for	communicating	about	this	complex	topic.		A	
simple	up-or-down	vote	could	send	mixed	and	confusing	signals.		
More	important,	we	see	no	reason	for	shareholders	to	vote	only	on	a	
company’s	executive	compensation	plan	among	all	of	the	other	major	
decisions	taken	by	a	board	of	directors.		Because	the	goal	of	those	
supporting	a	vote	is	to	open	a	dialogue	about	pay	issues,	we	urge	
compensation	committees	to	initiate	the	dialogue	up	front.
Transparent, honest, and meaningful communications:
•	 Directors	should	promote	honesty	in	reporting	not	only	on	financial	
results and other non-financial aspects of their company’s operations, 
but	also	on	the	risks,	opportunities	and	results	of	its	social	interac-
tions.	Such	reporting	should	show	how	the	company	evaluates	the	
long-term	impact	of	potential	costs	and	benefits.		But	aside	from	
mandated environmental and labor reporting to government regula-
tory	agencies,	corporate	“sustainability”	reporting	should	remain	
within	the	purview	and	at	the	discretion	of	the	individual	company	
(as it exercises its responsibility for honest and full communication 
with	shareholders).		Directors	should	use	their	authority	to	help	the	
company	to	find	a	firm-specific	way	to	communicate	effectively	with	
shareholders	and	the	public—through	the	regular	annual	report	to	
shareholders,	in	a	separate	public	report,	or	in	some	other	way.			
•	 Audit	committees	must	be	autonomous	and	vigorous.		In	order	to	
present a company’s position accurately, the board of directors must 
have	access	to	all	pertinent	data.		This	will	occur	only	if	a	board’s	
audit committee is competent, independent, and establishes effective 
control over both the internal auditors and the independent outside 
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auditors.	The	relationship	between	the	audit	committee	of	the	board	
and	the	outside	and	internal	auditors	is	crucial.	The	audit	committee	
should exercise the same tone of control over the internal auditor as 
it does over the external auditor, extending to decisions of hiring, 
firing,	and	compensation.
•	 Financial	information	is	inherently	judgmental	and	financial	state-
ments	would	be	more	useful	if	they	were	governed	by	fewer	rules	and	
displayed	more	of	the	judgment	that	lies	behind	estimated	numbers.	
Stock	analysts,	the	investing	public,	and	regulators	must	recognize	
the	inherently	judgmental	character	of	accounting	statements	and	
financial	information.		Ranges	of	values	rather	than	precise	numbers	
should	be	explained	and	understood	as	such.	In	addition,	financial	
statements	should	be	supplemented	with	non-financial	indicators	of	
value.
•	 Management	should	make	a	full,	timely,	and	transparent	disclosure	of	
its	compensation	to	shareholders.		The	compensation	discussion	
should be presented in one place in the company’s disclosure and 
should	include	all	forms	of	compensation.		Disclosures	should	be	
comprehensive	and	easily	understandable,	and	they	should	make	clear	
how	top	officers	would	be	compensated	under	plausible	retirement	or	
change-of-control	situations.		
•	 For	their	internal	assessments	of	performance,	we	recommend	that	
directors encourage management to adopt reporting systems that 
focus	attention	on	“value	drivers”	and	long-term	risks,	such	as	those	
proposed	by	the	Enhanced	Business	Reporting	framework.		Direc-
tors may consider requesting reports on such metrics as part of the 
information	provided	in	the	board	package.		Companies	also	should	
voluntarily provide information derived from those systems to 
complement	public	financial	reports.	
•	 Directors	regularly	should	consider	how	the	company	plans,	manages,	
and	communicates	its	interaction	with	society.		The	board	should	
insist that management report regularly to it and to the public on 
non-financial	performance,	including	social	performance.		To	institu-
tionalize	the	process,	the	board	may	want	to	establish	a	special	
committee	or	empower	its	governance	committee	to	take	responsibil-
ity	for	oversight.		That	committee	should	report	to	the	full	board	and	
appear	regularly	on	its	agenda.
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•	 Directors	should	recognize	the	value	of	corporate	communication	
with	shareholders	and	the	public	on	issues	that	bear	on	the	com-
pany’s	reputation	and	brand	value,	even	when	such	communication	
may not be required by regulation or fit neatly into financial disclo-
sure	formats.		Boards	that	have	a	non-executive	chair	or	lead	director	
may	want	to	consider	a	communications	role	for	that	person	on	such	
issues	and	topics.		
Long-term, sustainable performance:
•	 The	board	of	directors	has	ultimate	responsibility	for	the	performance	
of	the	corporation.		Directors	have	an	obligation	to	act	as	stewards	of	
the	corporation’s	long-term	economic	health.		They	should	widen	the	
purview	of	their	deliberations	to	give	weight	to	societal	issues	that	
impact	the	firm’s	longer-term	performance.		
•	 Directors	have	a	legal	obligation	and	duty	to	address	the	long-term	
performance	of	the	corporation.		Directors’	fiduciary	duties	include	
broader societal concerns that affirmatively affect the corporation’s 
performance	and	long-term	sustainability.		To	meet	that	duty,	direc-
tors	must	consider	the	concerns	of	all—not	just	current	shareholders,	
managers,	or	other	powerful	constituents—who	are	in	a	position	to	
affect	a	company’s	long-term	performance.		In	today’s	environment,	
boards	must	know	that	they	are	empowered	to	reject	actions	that	
produce only short-term financial results at the expense of the 
long-term	interests	of	the	corporation.		Compensation	policies,	for	
example, should not be designed to promote purely short-term 
share-price	enhancement.
•	 Acting	in	the	shareholders’	interests,	the	board	should	constructively	
engage	with	management	to	promote	the	development	of	long-term	
strategies.		Such	engagement	should	avoid	the	pitfall	of	microman-
agement;	rather,	it	should	focus	on	the	process	of	reviewing,	apprais-
ing, and enriching management’s plan, and on holding management 
accountable	for	its	continuing	evolution	and	execution.		To	be	clear,	
we	are	not	suggesting	that	boards	usurp	management	functions	by	
formulating	independent	strategies.		Our	recommendation	is	that	
directors exercise their duty to ensure that management has a long-
term	implementation	plan	for	a	strategy,	supported	by	risk	assess-
ment,	which	enhances	the	enduring	value	of	the	company.		After	
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reviewing	and	approving	a	strategy,	the	board	should	stay	involved	by	
holding management accountable for that strategy and ensuring that 
oversight	practices	are	in	place	to	assess	the	enterprise-wide	risks	to	
the	company.		Directors	should	measure	executives’	performance	
against	strategic	goals.				
•	 Choices	of	forms	of	compensation	should	promote	the	long-term	
value of the firm, rather than exploit favorable accounting or tax 
treatment.		We	note	that	recent	changes	in	accounting	for	stock	
options require that options be expensed on the accounting state-
ments	of	public	companies.		The	expensing	of	options	should	neutral-
ize	a	bias	that	has	favored	their	use	in	recent	years.		The	
compensation	committee	must	also	make	clear	the	effect	of	its	
compensation	decisions	on	stockholder	dilution.
•	 The	corporate	board	and	the	leaders	it	selects	must	integrate	relevant	
societal concerns, such as environmental and human rights consider-
ations, into corporate strategy to strengthen long-term competitive-
ness and the sustainability of both the corporation and the society in 
which	it	exists.		A	successful	framework	requires	that	societal	and	
business	leaders	view	and	treat	each	other	as	partners,	not	adversaries.	
Their actions and public communications should recognize their 
interdependence	and	shared	goals.	
•	 The	board	should	play	an	active	role	in	encouraging	company	man-
agement to evaluate the options available and to decide explicitly 
what	it	ought	to	do	based	on	sound	business	grounds	that	incorpo-
rate	a	longer-term	view.	Once	a	decision	has	been	made	and	justified,	
the board should monitor implementation and continue to evaluate 
the company’s strategy on the basis of long-term costs and long-term 
benefits.
•	 Political	leaders	should	understand	the	costs	they	impose	on	business	
and	society	at	large	if	they	do	not	take	action	to	improve	political	
governance	and	policy	making.		They	need	seriously	to	address	
reforms	in	ethics,	lobbying,	redistricting,	earmarks,	and	other	legisla-
tive	procedures	and	executive	practices	to	break	the	logjam	holding	
back	policy	reforms	in	substantive	areas	such	as	global	climate	
change.
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Conclusion
The conduct and performance of America’s leading corporations in recent 
years	have	seriously	undermined	confidence	in	U.S.	businesses	and	in	
business	leaders.		CED	policy	statements	on	corporate	governance	seek	
to improve the system of corporate governance and to restore public 
confidence	in	business.		Putting	businesses	on	sound	economic	and	
ethical footings and restoring public trust in business are critically 
important	to	our	economy	and	society.	U.S.	business	leaders	should	
consider	how	their	business	processes	can	be	improved,	how	they	can	
improve	business’s	ethical	standing,	how	their	business	strategies	can	
better	recognize	their	interaction	with	societal	issues,	and	how	they	
personally	can	make	a	difference	by	supporting	sound	public	policies	that	
address	society’s	key	concerns.		
CED is a non-profit, non-partisan organization of more than 200 business leaders 
and	university	presidents.		Since	1942,	its	research	and	policy	programs	have	
addressed many of the nations most pressing economic and social issues, including 
education	reform,	workforce	competitiveness,	campaign	finance,	health	care,	and	
global	trade	and	finance.		CED	promotes	policies	to	produce	increased	productiv-
ity and living standards, greater and more equal opportunity for every citizen, and 
an	improved	quality	of	life	for	all.		For	more	information	www.ced.org.
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